Introduction
Digital data hiding refers to the process of hiding secondary data in host datafor various applications including covert communications, access control, ownership assertion and annotation. Existing data hiding algorithms operate in the spatial [15] , or the frequency domain [9, 13] . The mechanism for embedding the hidden data includes spread spectrum based methods [2, 5, 8] , quantization based methods [4, 6, 12, 11, 10] and others [17] .
Most of the quantization based data hiding work focus on the tradeoff between embedding induced distortion, robustness to attacks, and capacity under power constraints for both the embedder and the attacker. For example, some researchers have proposed several embedding algorithms to optimize the tradeoff against specific attack distributions, such as AWGN and uniform noise. Optimal strategies for the attacker against these data hiding algorithms have also been proposed. For example, Goteti et al. [7] proposed "QIM watermarking games" and derived a solution of this game based on the Bhattacharyya bound on the probability of error (P e ). Note that this solution is approximate since it is based on a bound on the probability of error rather than an exact analytical expression. Tzschoppe et al. [14] proposed a complexity reduced watermarking game and derived the numerical solution (as opposed to an analytical solution) to this game by applying the Blahut-Arimoto algorithm [3, 1] . Vila-Forcen et al. [16] hypothesized (without proof) that the 3-δ function is the worst case additive attack against quantization based data hiding schemes. They also find a solution for the watermarking game in higher range of the watermarking noise ratio (WNR ≥ 4 3 ). In this paper, we theoretically prove that the worst case additive attack for quantization based data hiding is indeed a 3-δ function, and we then derive the optimal position of the 3-δ function for the entire range of WNR. Using a set of images (Barbara, Airplane, Baboon, Lena, Sena, Apple) as the host, we test the 3-δ attack signal against the scalar Costa scheme (SCS) [6] and the dither modulation embedding with distortion compensation (DC-DM) scheme proposed by Chen et al. [4] . The experimental results show that the 3-δ attack results in more probability of error than AWGN and the uniform noise.
Problem Formulation
In this paper, we use the quantization based data hiding scheme as the embedding method. Note that throughout this paper, we use scalar uniform quantizer in the data hiding scheme and the mathematical analysis is based on binary embedding which can be easily extend to non-binary cases. For the analysis in this paper, we make the flat-host assumption [12] which means that the statistics of the host can be assumed to be uniform and with infinite variance (in comparison to that of the hidden data). Further, we assume that the additive noise, N , is zero mean: (E(N ) = 0) and Let a bit k ∈ {0, 1} be embedded in the host signal, X, to produceX k . Let this signal be corrupted by the noise process N to give
Without lost of generality, we assume that the quantizer Q k for embedding a bit k is given by
and ∆ w is the step size of the quantizer. Then, the stego-signal after distortion compensation is:
where α is the distortion compensation factor.
The Probability of Error
With these assumptions, the pdf of the stego-signal for embedding a hidden bit is shown in Figure-1 . Since the hidden data is uniformly distributed,
Substitute Eqn-1 into Eqn-3,
then P e can be written in terms of G(x) as:
In the rest of this paper, we will prove that the worst case attack is a 3-δ function and derive the optimal placement for the 3-δ function to achieve the worst case attack.
Worst Case Attack: 3-δ function
The worst case attack can be obtained by maximiz-
we consider each range of α and show that the worst case attack is the 3-δ function in each case.
In this case, according to the definition of G(x) in Eqn-4, G(x) is given by,
1,
(where 0 ≤ C(x) ≤ 1) and graphically described in Figure-2 .
The goal of the worst case attack is to maximize P e as follows,
As seen from Figure-2, G(x) is symmetric over "0", so
From Eqn-4 and Eqn-5, f *
), since P e = 0 for any attack power spent in this range. We now calculate P e for other ranges of x.
with equality only if f N (x) = 0 for |x| ∈ (
, ∞), according to the definition of G(x) in this case.
f N (x)dx, then the attacking power spent in the range of |x| ∈
, ∞ , because when
, the attacking signal results in the maximum error with the least attacking power in the range of |x| ∈ , and is given
, Proof: Let f N (x) be any noise probability density function. Let ξ N (x) be a specific example given by
We show that in order to achieve the same value of P e , ξ N (x) needs to spend less power than any other f N (x).
Let P e be the probability of error achieved by f N (x), then
If ξ N (x) achieves the same P e ,
From the definition of G(x) (Eqn-5),we get , the powers associated with attack distribution of ξ N (x) and f N (x) are given by:
respectively. By simple mathematical manipulation (The details is omitted because of the page limitation), it can be shown that The proof is omitted, since it follows the same logic as the proof for Theorem-1. Also, in this case, for x ∈ − (1+2α)∆w 4
, −
Consolidating the above two cases, we can conclude that the worst case attack signal is a 3-δ function as shown in Figure-3 . Let's define
where l ∈ [l lower , l upper ] and A ∈ [0, 1] is a scalar factor. Since the attack power is constrained by D N ,
Substituting Eqn-13 for f N (x) from the above equation, we get
where
where l ∈ [σ n , l upper ] Using Equations-(4), (5), (10), (11), (16) , and (17), we express P e as a function of l and the watermark to noise ratio (WNR =
If WNR ≥ 1 12 ,
4 Optimal placement of the 3-δ function
In the previous subsection, we showed that the optimal strategy for an attacker is a 3-δ function under attack power constraint
We also showed the optimal placement of the 3-δ function for some special cases of α and WNR:
The corresponding probability of error (P e ) are
In the rest of this section, we will find the optimal placement of the 3-δ function for the other ranges of α and WNR.
Case 1:
and WNR > 1 12 We now define two terms: globally optimal probability of error, P glo e (l * ), which refers to the maximum value of P e obtained anywhere along l, and locally optimal probability of error, P loc e (l * ), which refers to the maximum value of P e within the valid range of l. We are interested in determining only P loc e (l * ) because we have a power constraint which determines the valid range for l. In some cases, the local and global optima coincide (and therefore lie inside the valid range). Under this condition, we can use the partial differential method to determine the optimal P e , P e (l * ). When the locally optimal point is different from the globally optimal solution, we need to use special methods.
Let l * glo = arg max l P e (l) denote the global optima. and the maximum power be P e (l * glo ). To maximize P e (l) with l, we take the partial differential of P e with respect to l,
and equalize it to zero to get l *
. It is easily verified that l * glo indeed maximizes P e . If the local and global optima coincide, the global optimum, l * glo , lies in the valid range. Then, according to Eqn-17,
. So in this case,
and l * = √ 3σ w (2α−1) α . So now we deal with the case where the local and global optima do not coincide, which means l * glo does not lie in [σ n ,
]. We split the problem into 2 cases: l * glo < σ n and l * glo > (3−2α)∆w 4
, which induce
and α > 5 6 .
* When
]. That is, P e is monotonically decreasing in the valid range [σ n ,
]. Therefore the local optimal solution is at the left edge of the range, l * = σ n and
: Using the same method as (
and P e (l * ) = max
So combining the solution for P e (l) for both cases of local optimal l * ,
The corresponding P e (l * ) is given by
Following the same logic with Case 1, we can get the l * and corresponding P (l * ) for the rest two cases: Case and WNR < 1 12 . Consolidating the solutions for all ranges, we get the optimal placement of the 3-δ function, l * given by:
(23) The corresponding P e (l * ) for WNR from -20dB to 20dB is graphically described in Figure- 
Experimental Results and Discussion
Using a set of 512x512 gray images (Barbara, Airplane, Baboon, Lena, Sena, Apple) as the host, we embed one bit per pixel. The performance comparison between uniform noise, AWGN and the derived 3-δ attack against DC-DM and SCS are shown in Figure-5 . As seen from this figure, the 3-δ attack results in more probability of error and is more attacking-efficient against DC-DM and SCS comparing to uniform noise and AWGN. As assumed by the definition of worst case additive attack, the 3-δ attack results in more P e than any other attacks for quantization based data hiding. As seen from Figure-5 , experimental results confirm the assumptions.
Conclusion
In this paper, we modeled the general quantization based data hiding scheme as a power constrained data hiding framework. Using the P e as the cost function, we proved that the best strategy for the attacker is a 3-δ function and derived the mathematical expression of the optimal strategy for the attacker. Experimental results show that the best strategy for the attacker results in the maximum P e compared to other attacks for any given quantization based scheme.
